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Abstract.  Using  Total  Factor  Productivity  (TFP)  as  a  measure  of 
corporate performance, this study compares the performance of owner 
management  to  that  of  firms  run  by  professional  managers  over  the 
period 2004-2006. We consider the influence of owner management for 
the  sample  as  a  whole  and  for  subgroups  of  firms.  The  findings 
demonstrate that family run firms are less productive than firms run by 
professional managers, but the difference between the two is small. Our 
results support the idea that in Italy there is not a genuine process of 
manager selection both for family and no-family firms. 
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1. Introduction 
The effects of family ownership on firm performance have received increased attention 
over the last two decades, without any conclusive results (Schulze and Gedajlovich, 
2010 amongst others). The issue is particularly relevant in Italy, since family firms have 
considerable importance in the economy and family control is the dominant form of 
ownership. Furthermore, this governance structure shows limited changes despite the 
extensive season of reforms developed between 1990 and 2005 to upgrade legal and 
financial framework of the Italian financial market (Giacomelli and Trento, 2005). 
Therefore, it is certainly worth investigating the role of ownership structure  in  the 
Italian economy, especially considering the sluggish economic growth observed over 
the last decade. A number of papers have shown how this slowdown can be attributed to 
the  structural  characteristics  of  the  productive  system,  which  render  it  incapable  of 
dealing  with  the  competitive  pressures  resulting  from  globalisation.  One  of  these 
characteristics, the limited size of the firm, translates into a low level of innovation, a 
low  presence  in  international  markets  and  a  specialisation  in  traditional  sectors.  Of 
course, the question of size is related to the ownership structure (Bank of Italy, 2009, 
Bianchi et al., 2005). Indeed, family run firms tend to be characterised by prudence in 
strategic decision-making, due to the close connection between family and firm assets. 
Moreover, such firms demonstrate a reluctance to resort to outside managers, even when 
there is a shortage of internal resources (Bank of Italy, 2009). These characteristics, 
which may have a negligible effect in periods of stable growth, can become a severe 
handicap when the economic system has to deal with competitive pressures brought 
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about by market globalisation such as the Italian system has experienced over the last 
years. 
With regards the case of Italy, many papers have analysed how family ownership affects 
firms’  behaviour  and  performance  defined  in  several  ways  (Bandiera  et  al.,  2008; 
Barba-Navaretti et al., 2008; Bianco et al., 2009; Bloom et al., 2008; Cucculelli and 
Micucci, 2008; Lippi and Schivardi, 2009; Sciascia and Mazzola, 2008), but none has 
studied  the  relationship  between  family  management  and  total  factor  productivity 
(TFP). The aim of the paper is to fill this gap. .The focus is on management  because in 
Italy family firms are mainly managed by a member of the family (Bank of Italy, 2009; 
Giacomelli  and  Trento,  2005;  UniCredit,  2008).  We  use  TFP  because  it  may  be  
considered a proper measure of firms’ performance for several reasons. First, unlike 
financial  measurements  (ROE,  ROI,  Tobin’s  Q),  productivity  is  less  exposed  to 
manipulation by accountants (Palia and Lichtenberg, 1999). Second, TFP intrinsically 
determines the equilibrium value of financial variables, such as profit and stock price 
(Griffell-Tatje and Lovell, 1999). In addition, performance measures based on market 
prices can be used only if the stock market is efficient (Brealey and Myers, 2000), 
which is not the case for Italy. Moreover, the use of measures based on market prices  
enables researchers to consider only listed firms which are just a small percentage of 
firms,  while  our  sample  combines  both  listed  and  non  listed  firms.  Finally,  many 
contributions have shown how Italy’s productivity slowdown, observed over the last 
decade, can be attributed to total factor productivity (amongst others OECD, 2007; Van 
Ark et al., 2007) . 
The main contribution of this study is to empirically assess whether firms run by a 
member of the owner family are more or less productive than firms run by professional 
managers over the period 2004-2006. TFP is estimated at firm level by using Levinshon 
and Petrin (2003) approach over the period 1998-2006. The empirical evidence is based 
on  data  from  the  Xth  Capitalia-UniCredit  survey  (2008)  collected  through  a 
questionnaire sent to a sample of Italian manufacturing firms and complemented with 
balance sheet data.  
The findings demonstrate that professional managers are more efficient in operating the 
firm  than  owner-managers.  The  difference  between  firms  that  are  managed  by  a 
member of the family and those operated by professional managers is estimated to be 
around 4%. The effect of the managerial regime is not homogeneous, however, rather it 
varies depending on the firm’s characteristics. Productivity gaps between family and 
professional management are significant for small businesses, exporting firms, firms 
that do not innovate, those belonging to the scale intensive sector and firms located in 
Northern Italy.   
The work is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the theoretical issues 
and empirical evidence. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 reports methodology and 
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes, while the Appendix provides information on the 
database, definitions and methodology used to estimate TFP. 
 
2. The literature  
A  number  of  studies  have  investigated  the  impact  of  family  influence  on  the 
performance of a firm
1. The relevant literature is, in many ways, divided on the view 
that concentrated family ownership as well as owner-management may have beneficial 
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Gedajlovich (2010). 3 
economic  consequences.  Two  different  perspectives  are  used-  agency  theory  and 
stewardship  theory-  each  revealing  evidence  for  and  against  the  benefits  of  family 
involvement (Chrisman et al., 2005;  Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2009). 
As to the distinction between owner-management and non-owner management, agency 
theory would predict a positive effect on value of firms, because owner-management 
aligns the interests of owners and managers (Jensen and Mechling, 1976). Yet, this 
effect  may  be  offset  by  the  costs  of  family  management.  Family  managers  are  not 
recruited from the general market for managers and this situation generally leads to a 
lower quality among owner-managers than professional managers and may reduce a 
firm’s productivity. Moreover, family run firms tend to be characterised by prudence in 
strategic decision-making, due to the close connection between family and firm assets. 
This risk aversion may prevent owner-managers from adopting new and productivity-
enhancing management principles as too risky or breaking with business and family 
traditions.  
Stewardship is another informative perspective from which to view the advantages and 
disadvantages of a family business. Stewardship theory posits that many leaders and 
executives identify themselves with the organization (Davis et al.1997). This attitude 
will be especially prevalent among family businesses in which leaders are either family 
members  or  emotionally  linked  to  the  family.  There  may  be  a  strong  incentive  for 
family owners and executives, therefore, to act in the long-run interests of the company 
and  all  its  stakeholders  by  investing  in  new  processes,  products  and  marketing 
(Habberson and Williams, 1999; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). However, other researchers 
suggest  that many of the advantageous  attributes  can  become disadvantages,  due to 
conflicts of interests within the family or distort incentives due to altruism or kinship 
behaviour  (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Schulze et al., 2002).   
From a theoretical point of view, therefore, the effect of family management on firm’s 
performance remains  an open issue. These conflicting ideas have recently evoked a 
number of empirical examinations of the relationship between family management and 
firm performance. Even the empirical evidence provides no uniform answer. Although 
not  entirely  conclusive,  many  contributions  on  different  countries  show  that  family 
firms are more profitable or show higher market valuation when the management is 
handled by the founder. On the other hand, negative effects emerge when descendant 
runs the firm
2. The only exceptions to this consensus are some studies on France (Sraer 
and Thesmar, 2007), on Italy (Favero et al., 2006) and on continental Europe (Barontini 
and Caprio, 2006) which find that family owned firms, first or later generations, 
perform better than firms with widely held ownership structures. 
As regards how family management influences firm productivity (the main purpose of 
this work) the empirical literature is less extensive and the results are mixed.  Palia and 
Lichtenberg (1999)  and   Martikainen et al. (2009) find a posit ive effect for US firms. 
Barth et al. (2005) document a negative relationship between family management and 
firm productivity for Norway.  
As far as the authors know, similar studies for Italy have yet to be seen
3. Some papers 
have  analysed  the  performance   of  family  managed  firms  using  market -based  and 
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for US; Bennedsen et al. (2007) for Denmark; Bertrand et al. (2008) for Thailand; Cucculelli and Micucci 
(2008) for Italy. 
3Lippi and Schivardi (2009) use TFP as a measure of performance, but the focus of their work is on a 
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a private return from employment relationship with the managers. They assume that some firm owners 4 
accounting-based performance. Most of these have found that family firms and family 
run firms perform worse (Caselli and Di Giuli, 2009; Sciascia and Mazzola, 2008)
4. 
Other studies focusing on the founder eff ect provide mixed results.  Cucculelli and 
Micucci (2008) find a positive founder effect followed by a marked drop in the post -
succession performance. On the other hand, Favero et al. (2006) show that family 
owned firms, first or later generations, perform   better than  firms with widely held 
ownership structures. Other papers focus on management practices. Bloom et al. (2008) 
show that Italian entrepreneurs are reluctant to formally hand over the management of 
the firm to outside figures and this may have se vere productivity implications.  In the 
analysis of the ways in which managers are hired and incentives offered, Bandiera et al. 
(2008) confirm these findings
5.  
 
3. Data description  
This  section  presents  firms’  characteristics  according  to  type  of  ownership  and 
management. It draws on data  from the Xth Capitalia-UniCredit survey (2008), which 
was compiled on the basis of the information collected in a questionnaire sent to a 
sample of Italian manufacturing firms and complemented with balance sheet data. 
In  the  literature,  there  is  no  single  definition  of  a  family  business  (Astrachan  and 
Shanker, 2003; Chua, 1999; Miller et al., 2007). In this paper information on ownership 
(whether  the  firm  is  family-owned  or  not)  and  on  owner-management  is  based  on 
response  to  a  specific  question  on  ownership  and  management  included  in  the  Xth 
Capitalia-UniCredit questionnaire (2008)
6. 
We distinguish firms by ownership type and by management regime, but our focus here 
is  on  family  management   rather  than  ownership.  As  rega rds  management,  we 
distinguish three types of firms:  (i) family firms run by a family member ( owner 
management);  (ii)  family  firms  run  by  a  professional  manager  outside  the  family  
(outside management); and (iii) a broader category includes both the family firms run 
by a manager outside the family (point ii) and non-family firms which presumably are 
also run by a professional manager (professional management)
7 (table 1).  
Table 1 reports average values of a number of variables for 2006 and the distribution of 
firms (in parentheses)  on the basis of their  characteristics,  such as  the relevance of 
                                                                                                                                               
derive utility not only from profits but also from employing managers with whom they have developed a 
personal tie.  For example, the owner of a family business might enjoy a compliant entourage and/or a 
group of managers that pursue the prestige of the family. They  show that the greater the value of the 
private returns, the higher the probability that senior low-capabilities managers are retained and the lower 
the productivity of the firm. As a consequence, the model predicts that a higher value of the personal 
relation  increases  the  average  managers'  tenure  and  decreases  the  firm  productivity.  They  test  these 
predictions using a sample of Italian manufacturing firms over 1984-1997 and find that the government 
and  family  firms  have  a  larger  share  of  senior  managers,  display  lower  values  of  TFP  and  are 
characterized by a negative relation between TFP and the share of senior manager. 
4Caselli and Di Giuli (2009) show that the family firms with a non family Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
perform better than both family firms with a family CFO and nonfamily firms. Sciascia and Mazzola 
(2008)  find  a  negative  quadratic  relatio nship  between  family  involvement  in  management  and 
performance, but no association between family involvement in ownership and performance.   
5 Other works, that focus on firm’s behaviour, stress how the greater risk aversion of Italian family firms 
can influence investment decisions (Bianco et al. 2009) or the decision to enter foreign markets (Barba-
Navaretti et al., 2008).  
6 Additional information on database and definitions can be found in the appendix. 
7 The choice to consider professional management in family and non-family firms jointly finds support by 
Bloom et al. (2008). Their results show that family owned firms run by external management are 
statistically undistinguishable from non family firms 5 
exports and innovation, Pavitt sector, size and territorial distribution. Family firms make 
up 63% of the sample (1,835 out of 2,920 firms) and 90% of these are run by a family 
member  (1636  out  of  1835).  This  illustrates  the  difference  between  Italy  and  other 
countries. The difference lies not so much in the importance of family groups within the 
economy as this phenomenon is common in other countries (La Porta, 1999), but rather 
in the fact that family management is the dominant form of management (Bianchi et al. 
2005; Bloom et al., 2008; UniCredit, 2008). 
Looking at the total sample we find that, on average, family firms' value added, number 
of employees, capital, white collar share, labour productivity (value added/number of 
employees) are lower than non family firms. More importantly, the TFP, estimated with 
Levinsohn and Petrin approach
8, is lower both overall and for all the sub -samples of 
firms considered: listed  and non-listed, exporters and non exporters 
9, innovators and 
non innovators,
10 Pavitt sector, size and territorial area.  
The firms considered are representative for the Italian industrial structure, in particular 
as regards medium and large firms. They op erate predominantly in traditional sectors  
and  are  located  in  Northern  and  Central  Italy,  a  high  percentage  of  which  are 
exporters
11. Nevertheless, several differences emerge between the groups considered: 
family  firms  are  substantially  smaller  than  the  av erage  (only  7%  have  over  250 
employees, while this figure rises to 12% for non family firms) and they are specialised 
in traditional activities (50% of family run firms are found in the supplier dominated 
sector, while the figure is 46.5% for the non-family firms). As regards innovation, 59% 
of the family run firms carried out some form of innovation over the period 2004-2006, 
while the figure is 56.9% for  the non-family firms. Moreover, only a small number of 
family run firms are listed  (1% compared to 3%  for the others), which indicates their 
desire to maintain control and the consequent reluctance to look for outside investors.  
                                                 
8 See Appendix  for details. 
9 The status of exporting is available in Xth wave of  UniCredit-Capitalia survey, given by the answer to 
the question “Did you export in 2006?”. 
10 We consider innovative any firm that claimed in the questionnaire to have carried out innovations in the 
period 2004-2006. 
11 The percentage of exporting firms in the sample is 68% as opposed to 17% according to ISTAT (2008). 
This might be a consequence of the fact that, in the Capitalia-Unicredit sample, the firms with fewer than 
10 employees are not considered and there are few firm s with less than 50 employees. These firms are 
characterized by a low degree of internationalization: exporting firms make up only 10% of those firms 
with fewer than 9 employees and 46% of those with 10  to 50 employees, while this figure becomes 78% 
for firms with more than 50 employees (ISTAT, 2008). 6 
Table 1. Firms' characteristics by ownership and management type (average values) 
         Ownership  Management regime 



















Value added  54406  92764  53881  86651  91807 
Number of employees  95  136  86  167  141 
Capital  52744  71836  47207  98679  76039 
Age  33  32  33  33  33 
White collar share  37.9  43.6  38.2  35.2  42.3 
Labour productivity  550  584  548  572  582 
TFP  845  934  833  950  936 
  Listed  1268  1533  1132  1449  1519 
      (1,0%)  (3,0%)  (0,7%)  (3,5%)  (3,1%) 
  Export status            
    Exporters  878  968  865  967  968 
      (68,5%)  (67,6%)  (67,1%)  (79,9%)  (69,5%) 
    Non exporters  774  864  766  889  866 
      (31,1%)  (31,8%)  32.5  19.6  29.9 
  Innovation status            
    Innovators  879  934  868  968  940 
      (59,0%)  (56,9%)  (58,6%)  (62,8%)  (57,8%) 
    Non innovators  791  946  775  942  946 
      (35,7%)  (37,8%)  (36,4%)  (30,2%)  (36,6%) 
  Pavitt Sectors            
    Supplier dominated   765  809  756  854  816 
      (49,9%)  (46,5%)  (50,6%)  (44,2%)  (46,2%) 
    Scale intensive   921  1071  898  1104  1076 
      (19,1%)  (18,9%)  (19,1%)  (19,6%)  (19%) 
    Specialised suppliers   910  989  902  965  985 
      (26,8%)  (29,4%)  (26%)  (32,7%)  (29,9%) 
    Science based  1026  1241  1016  1116  1226 
      (4,3%)  (5,2%)  (4,3%)  (3,5%)  (4,9%) 
  By class of employees            
    Small (less than 50 )  720  764  715  776  766 
      (57,3%)  (53%)  (58,8%)  (45,2%)  (51,8%) 
    Medium (50-250)  955  997  948  1007  999 
      (35,5%)  (34,7%)  (34,8%)  (41,7%)  (35,8%) 
    Large (>250)  1326  1530  1316  1365  1502 
      (7,1%)  (12,3%)  (6,4%)  (13,1%)  (12,4%) 
  By territorial area            
    North  864  958  849  988  962 
      (74,8%)  (75,2%)  (74,9%)  (74,4%)  (75,1%) 
    Center  848  872  843  884  875 
      (15,6%)  (15%)  (15,3%)  (18,1%)  (15,5%) 
    South  692  838  691  700  822 
      (9,5%)  (9,8%)  (9,8%)  (7,5%)  (9,4%) 
N. observations  1835  1085  1636  199  1284 
All variables computed for 2006. Data in value deflated and expressed in euros. In parentheses shares 
with respect to the total of the column. The share for exporting/non exporting firms and innovating/non 
innovating firms may not sum to 100 since some firms did not answer the questions in the survey. 
Source: elaborations on data from Capitalia-UniCredit (2008) 7 
Similar differences are found when we compare management type, which reveals better 
performances by no family managers than family members.  
Also in this case, the result is confirmed by all the indicators used: value added, number 
of employees, capital, white collar share and labour productivity. Turning to TFP we 
find firms run by professional managers perform better both overall and in each of the 
subgroups considered. Furthermore, firms run by a non-family manager are more open 
to the market (3.1% listed firms compared to 0.7% for family run firms); they tend to be 
larger (the proportion of firms with over 250 employees is double that for family run 
firms); they are more active on the international scene (69.5% compared to 67.1% for 
family  run  firms)  and  finally  they  are  less  present  in  traditional  sectors  (46.2% 
compared to 50.6%) and less concentrated in the south of the country. 
In conclusion, the data confirm the major aspects of the Italian corporate governance 
model, i.e. firms are still mainly run by family members, though this is less so for larger 
firms, listed companies and specialised suppliers. Firms not run by family members, on 
the other hand, are larger, more productive, use more skilled workers and enjoy higher 
TFP than their family run counterparts.  
 
4. Empirical strategy and results 
The analysis of simple summary statistics does not, of course, allow us to isolate the 
possible effects on productivity of other covariates. In order to disentangle the effect of 
family management and other factors on firm productivity, therefore, we turn to an 
econometric  analysis.  To  investigate  whether  firms  run  by  a  member  of  the  owner 
family are more or less productive than firms run by professional managers we estimate 







j FM D X D
1 1
1 0   [1] 
where    is the firm TF P  (in logarithm)  estimated by using Levinsohn and Petrin 
approach,  FM D  is a binary variable taking the value one if the firm is run by a member 
of the owner family  and zero otherwise, X a vector of firm-level variables highlighted 
by previous literature as important drivers of TFP and  D a set of  sector dummies, 
grouping firms according to both the Pavitt taxonomy and the ATECO sub-sections, and 
territorial area dummies. Our parameter of interest is  1 that measures whether firms 
managed by a member of the owner family are more or less productive than non-family-
managed  firms.  Firms  characteristics include:  firm  size  (measured  by  the log  of 
employment),  the log of firm’s age in 2006; a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is 
listed on the stock market;  the share of white collar workers on total employment as a 
proxy of human capital
12.  
Equation [1] is estimated by standard ordinary least squares
13  considering average 
values of 2004-2006 period for TFP and employment
14.  
                                                 
12 Among the firm-level predictors the correlation coefficients are very low, which confirms that these 
variables capture distinct characteristics of firms and that the results do not suffer from a serious problem 
of multicollinearity of firm predictors (see appendix for correlation matrix)..  
13  This  equation  probably  suffers  from  omitted  variable  problems  since  unit  heterogeneity  is  not 
considered. One way to allow for unobserved heterogeneity is the fixed effe cts model. However, panel 
data analysis cannot be performed, due to the lack of time series in management variables.  
14 We use TFP and employment in the form of three-year averages over the period of the survey (2004-
2006) to limit influence of shocks and  measurement errors in specific years.  Moreover, the use of the 8 
Table 2 reports the empirical estimates from the TFP equation on all manufacturing 
firms. We found that family-managed firms are, on average, 5.3% less productive than 
non-family firms
15 when we only control for firm size (model 1). The results do not 
change when we consider age, whether the firm is listed, Pavitt sectors and territorial 
area (model 2). By adding human capital (model 3), we get a picture of the sensitivity of 
the relationship between family management and productivity to differences in human 
capital. The productivity gap decreases by a 1.3 percentage point and this could reflect 
that firms run by a family are less intensive in human capital
16,17.  
 
Tab. 2 The owner-management in family firms and productivity 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3   Model 4   Model 5
1  
Intercept  5.899***  5.799***  5.622***  5.785***  5.612*** 
   (169.29)  (121.26)  (109.37)  (104.45)  (105.69) 
Manager from the owner family  -0.054***  -0.053***  -0.040***  -0.037***  -0.034** 
   (-3.48)  (-3.46)  (-2.63)  (-2.49)  (-2.19) 
Log number of employees  0.199***  0.195***  0.209***  0.210***  0.208*** 
   (24.82)  (24.98)  (26.34)  (26.36)  (25.06) 
Log age     0.015  0.018  0.010  0.021* 
      (1.27)  (1.55)  (0.88)  (1.82) 
Listed firm     0.161***  0.128**  0.128**  0.123** 
      (2.67)  (2.17)  (2.07)  (1.86) 
White collar share       0.283***  0.269***  0.275*** 
        (8.81)  (8.39)  (8.34) 
Sectors  no  yes  yes  yes  yes 
      (Pavitt)  (Pavitt)  (ATECO)  (Pavitt) 
F-sector test     40.07***  31.83***  18.45***  30.10*** 
Territorial area  no  yes  yes  yes  yes 
F-area test    15.06***  13.13***  21.61***  13.29*** 
R
2  0.22  0.28  0.31  0.34  0.30 
F-statistics  332.69***  121.12***  120.69***  70.85***  109.04*** 
White test statistic  21.51***  68.22***  90.71***  185.67***  90.06*** 
Number of observations  2876  2802  2795  2795  2692 
Dependent variable: log of TFP (average values for 2004-2006 period). In parentheses, t-values based on 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. Level of significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
(1) Model 5 refers to the sample net of foreign ownership firms. 
 
In  model  4,  the  family  management  relationship  is  not  altered  by  the  inclusion  of 
industry dummies at the ATECO sub-sections level instead of Pavitt classification. In 
the fifth column (model 5) we report results obtained by estimating the equation without 
foreign owned firms and find that the productivity differential between family run firms 
                                                                                                                                               
three-year averages limits the extent of missing data, nevertheless the results using 2006 values (not 
reported here)  are very similar. 
15 Percentage differences in TFP can be obtained as  100 * 1 ) exp( 1 , where  1is the estimated 
coefficient associated to the management regime dummy. 
16 The assumption is that the parameters for white collar share are the same for family managed and non 
family managed firms. We have tested this assumption by introducing an interaction effect between the 
white collar share and  FM D . Since the coefficient of this interaction effect is statistically insignificant, 
we can accept the hypothesis of the equality of human capital parameters. 
17  Unreported estimates show that the productivity differential is still negative, but not statistically 
significant, when we consider only family -owned firms and compare owner management with outside 
management.  9 
and the others is smaller (-0.034 instead of -0.040). This result might be due both to the 
fact that foreign firms (99 in our sample) display higher TFP (on average the value is 
1,169) than domestic firms (average value 867)
18 and, in our sample, there are more 
foreign firms in the group of non family run firms (66 firms compared to 33 family run 
firms).  
 
Tab. 3 Robustness checks 
Sub-samples   Model 3  
Coefficient of the Manager from the owner family 
dummy    
Exporters  -0.036** 
  (-2.07) 
No exporters  -0.047 
  (1.57) 
Innovators  -0.017 
  (-0.84) 
Non innovators  -0.077*** 
  (-3.05) 
By class of employees   
Small (less than 50 employees)  -0.044** 
   (-2.26) 
Medium (50-250)  -0.006 
   (0.25) 
Large (>250)  -0.062 
  (-1.16) 
Pavitt sectors   
Supplier dominated   -0.030 
   (-1.35) 
Scale intensive   -0.117*** 
   (-3.13) 
Specialised suppliers   -0.005 
   (-0.18) 
 Science based  -0.020 
   (-0.28) 
Territorial area   
North  -0.045*** 
   (-2.67) 
Center   -0.004 
   (-0.11) 
South  -0.025 
   (-0.42) 
Dependent variable: log of TFP (average values for 2004-2006 period). 
In parentheses, t-values based on heteroskedastic-robust standard errors.  
Level of significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
 
Our  evidence  on  productivity  differentials  is  obtained  as  an  average  across  all  the 
manufacturing  sector.  The  results  could,  therefore,  stem  from  some  underlying 
heterogeneity rather than from differences in management structure. In order to take this 
into account and check the robustness of our results, we split our sample into different 
                                                 
18  This result is in line with the empirical literature (for example, see Barba Navaretti and Venables, 
2004).  10 
groups. The first sub-sample is according to export status, while the second split is 
between innovative and non-innovative firms. In the literature, indeed, heterogeneity 
within sectors is either explained by self-selection of more efficient firms in the export 
market (Melitz, 2003)
19 or in terms of innovation (Klette and Kortum, 2004). Moreover, 
family management could have a different impact depending on the sector, size or 
location of the firms.  This last point is especially crucial for Italy where, as is well 
known, a territorial dualism persists. To control for these sources of heterogeneity,  we 
compute the effect of family firm management separately for size (small, medium, 
large), location (North, Centre, South) and sector, grouping firms according to the Pavitt 
taxonomy.  
Table 3 reports results of these robustness checks on model 3  with the focus on the 
managerial regime dummy coefficient. Estimates show that the dummy’s coefficient is 
negative in  all groups,  while there are differences  in  the statistical  significance  and 
magnitude  of  productivity  gaps.  The  findings  provide  evidence  that  even  when 
exporting, family run firms are less productive than others, while the coefficient for non 
exporters  is  not  statistically  significant.  On  the  contrary,  the  coefficient  of  the 
managerial regime dummy is more pronounced in the sample of non innovative firms 
than in the full sample as indicated by a productivity gap of  more than 7%, while there 
is no significant difference for innovators.  
The  small  firms  are  the  ones  where  the  family  management  effect  is  stronger  and 
statistically significant, while for medium firms there is almost no difference between 
the family run enterprises and the others. 
In  terms  of  sector  characteristics,  interesting  results  emerge  from  the  heterogeneity 
analysis: only scale intensive firms display a statistically significant coefficient for the 
family management dummy, with an even stronger effect than the one found in the full 
sample, indicating  a  gap of 11%. However, for the specialised suppliers group that 
includes the machine and machine tools industry, the backbone of  the Italian model of 
international  specialisation,  there  is  no  substantial  difference  between  the  two 
management regimes. Finally, the findings indicate that, while for the northern firms, 
the productivity gap is significant, for firms localised in the central and southern part of 
the country we find no significant effect.  
In conclusion, three main findings emerge from our analysis. First, for all specifications 
and  groups  of  firms,  enterprises  run  by  a  member  of  the  owner  family  are  less 
productive than those  run by  non-family-managers. Second, human capital  is  a key 
variable in explaining differences in productivity between family run firms and their 
counterparts. Finally, the effect of the managerial regime is not homogeneous, rather it 
varies depending on the firm’s characteristics. Productivity gaps between professionally 
and owner-managed family firms are significant for small businesses, exporting firms, 
firms  that  do  not  innovate,  those  belonging  to  the  scale  intensive  sector  and  firms 
located in Northern Italy.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Using TFP as a measure of firms’ performance, this study compares the influence of 
owner management to firms run by a professional manager. The analysis allows us to 
                                                 
19 In the case of Italian firms, several works provide empirical support to the prediction of the self-
selection  hypothesis  that  only  firms  who  are  efficient  enough  to  bear  entry  costs  and  the  intense 
competition of the export market will export (Castellani, 2002; Castellani and Giovannetti, 2010; Serti 
and Tomasi, 2008). 11 
show the main features of the corporate governance model of Italian companies, a large 
proportion of which are family owned and family run, though the percentage of family 
run firms diminishes in large firms, listed companies and specialised suppliers. Firms 
not run by the owner family are larger, more productive, and their workforce is more 
skilled than their family run counterparts. In particular, their TFP is higher on average 
both overall and for all the subgroups of firms considered:, export status, innovative 
activities, Pavitt sector, size and territorial area. 
The econometric analysis based on a sample of Italian manufacturing firms shows that 
family managed firms are, on average, 5% less productive than non-family managed 
firms after controlling for sector, area, as well as other  characteristics, such as age and 
being listed on the Stock Exchange. We also find that the TFP gap drops to 4% when 
we include the share of white-collar employees suggesting that this factor contributes to 
the productivity gap. The effect of the managerial regime is not homogeneous rather it 
varies with respect to the firm’s characteristics, both in the statistical significance and in 
the magnitude of productivity gap but not in the sign, which is always negative.  
Our results are in line with previous studies on Italian firms such as Caselli and Di Giuli 
(2009),  Lippi and Schivardi (2009) and Sciascia and Mazzola (2008), which found, 
considering different measures of performance, that family run firms perform worse 
than  non-family  managed  firms.  However  the  difference  between  the  two  is  small         
(-4%),  especially if we  compare with  the result reported by  Barth  et  al.  (2005) for 
Norwegian firms (-14%). This result may reflect the system of managers selection in 
Italy. As Bandiera et al. (2008) show for the service sector, managers in non-family-
firms  are  more  likely  hired  through  formal  channels  than  in  firms  with  family 
ownership, but less than their international counterparts. 
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Appendix  
Data 
The  data  used  come  from  the  Xth  Capitalia-UniCredit  survey  (2008)  of  Italian 
manufacturing firms, based on information from a completed questionnaire and balance 
sheets. The survey, which covers a sample of firms with 11 to 500 employees and all 
firms with over 500 employees, gathered information on the main characteristics of the 
Italian  manufacturing  system.  The  questionnaire  refers  to  2004-2006  and  contains 
information  on  firm  structure,  ownership  structure,  workforce  composition,  physical 
capital and innovation, as well as the degree of internationalization. The balance sheet 
data refer, instead, to 1998-2006. The original data refer to 5,100 firms. In order to 
estimate TFP we carry out a data cleaning procedure: we eliminated the firms which 
presented negative values of value added from the original archive and firms with a 
growth rate of value added and of employees below the first or above the ninety-ninth 
percentile of the distribution. Finally, firms for which at least 7 years data regarding 
employee numbers was not available were also excluded. After the cleaning procedure 
our sample is equal to 2920 firms. 
 
Ownership structure and management   
Our information on ownership (family-owned or not) and on owner-management are 
based on response to the following question:  
If your company is controlled or owned by an individual or a family who runs the 
company? 
1.  the person who owns or controls the company or a member of the family that 
owns or controls the company; 
2.  a manager hired from outside the company; 
3.  a manager hired from inside the company. 
 
Construction of TFP variable 
TFP  at  firm  level  is  estimated  by  using  Levinshon  and  Petrin  (2003)  approach. 
Productivity was estimated using the following log-linear specification of a production 
function:   




K it u l k y 0             (1’) 
with  i = 1,……..N  firms, t = 1998, ……2006 and where y represents the value added, l 
the number of employees,  
MAT k  the stock of physical capital,  0 measures the average 
efficiency and  it u  represents the deviation of firm i from this average at time t.  The error 
term can be decomposed into two parts: 
it it it u          (2’)  
where the term  it represents the productivity of firm i at time t and  it is a stochastic 
term which includes not only the measurement error, but also the shocks which are 
unobservable to firms, and, therefore, do not correlate with inputs.  
Productivity  it is known to the firm which, therefore, in the case of positive shocks to 
productivity, can decide to increase production by raising the level of inputs. This 
determines a problem of simultaneity which Levinshon and Petrin (2003) resolved by 
identifying in the demand for intermediate goods a proxy  related to the variations in 
TFP known to firms.  
Equation (1’) was estimated by utilizing as proxy of the stock of physical capital the 
tangible  fixed  assets  and  the  demand  for  intermediate  goods  was  measured  by  the 16 
operating costs. The value added has been deflated by using the ISTAT production price 
index available for each ATECO sector. As regards the tangible fixed assets, data have 
been deflated by using the average production price indices of the following sectors: 
machines  and  mechanical  appliances,  electrical  machines  and  electrical  equipment, 
electronics and optics and means of transport. For the operating costs, we adopt the 
intermediate consumption deflator calculated by using data from ISTAT. 
The TFP used in this paper has been estimated in Aiello et al. (2010), to which those 
interested can refer for further details. 
 
Correlation matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
TFP (1) 1.00
Family management (2) -0.11 1.00
Log employees (3) 0.48 -0.10 1.00
Log age (4) 0.12 0.04 0.18 1.00
Listed firm (5) 0.14 -0.09 0.18 0.05 1.00
White collar share (6) 0.11 -0.08 -0.17 -0.06 0.04 1.00
Dummy South (7) -0.13 0.01 -0.02 -0.09 -0.01 -0.06 1.00
Dummy Center (8) -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.14 1.00
Dummy Pavitt 2 (9) 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.04 1.00
Dummy Pavitt 3 (10) 0.12 -0.05 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.07 -0.11 -0.07 -0.30 1.00
Dummy Pavitt 4 (11)  0.10 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.14 -0.04 -0.02 -0.11 -0.14 1.00
(obs=2795)  
 
 
 